Introduction
All the European Union Member States have long traditions of state activity in providing key services to their citizens and underpinning both such which is quite distinct both from traditional government activity and from traditional private enterprise, subject to both special principles and special regulatory structures.
The development of new structures for the provision of public services presents both dangers and opportunities. The key danger is that the 'public interest', the raison d'etre for state involvement in services will be displaced by the pursuit of other interests or values, either because core public interest values are marginalised within new arrangements, or because these arrangements have less capacity to deliver public interest outcomes. 7 Conversely, the opportunities presented by these changes are to engage in a thorough evaluation of the range of values to be pursued in the context of services of general interest, and to design regimes capable of securing the achievement of those values. Accordingly this article examines the means by which services to which special principles should be applied can be identified and focuses on the range of sometimes contradictory values denoted by the term 'services of general interest', examining the range of regime-types by which those values might be pursued. The concluding section suggests the matching of values to techniques should not be made according to the importance of the values to be pursued, but rather by reference to which techniques are likely to be effective given the configuration of interests and capacities and existing culture within the domain which is the target of intervention.
Identifying Services of General Interest
Utilities Sectors', in J. Black, P. Muchlinksi and P. Walker (eds) Commercial Regulation and Judicial Review, Oxford: Hart Publishing; Black, J. 1996 'Constitutionalising Self-Regulation', Modern Law Review 59(1): 24-55. 5 Freedland op cit n.1. The term 'services of general interest' is a juridical conception, the chief purpose of which is to delineate activities deserving of special treatment within the European Community legal system from those which must submit to all the rules of the internal market. 8 The term has developed a special role in debate about EC policy as coalitions have been formed to balance the liberalising tendencies of the European Commission with alternative socially oriented policies. 9 The distinction between services falling within the group and those falling outside is premised on the nature of the service rather than the status or ownership of the service provider, and thus it transcends a traditional juridical public-private divide. 10 This concept provides a central mechanism through which the social and economic aspirations of the European Community are mediated. 11 It is a culturally constructed doctrine, a product of the time and context in which it was devised, and which has subsequently been developed and amplified through the official pronouncements of the various EC institutions. 12 The term 'services of general interest' is closely linked to the doctrines in various of the Member States which impose special obligations on the operators of certain essential services, for example in France under the rubric Service Public and in Italy the Servizio Pubblico. As with the EC legal doctrine, the French Service Public doctrine plays a central role in distinguishing those services to which special obligations apply from other 8 This is particularly true for the 'services of general economic interest' which are the subject matter of an limited exception to the general principle that EC competition and internal market rules should apply to public undertakings: Article 86(2) EC. 9 J. Pelkmans 'Utilities Policy and the European Union' in P. Vass services. 13 Summarising the literature on the French doctrine one commentator has suggested that it has no agreed meaning. In particular the term refers both to public sector institutional structures and to the materialised principles which apply to the provision of public services . 14 It is the latter which is of interest here, but it is very difficult to discern a precise normative content to the Service Public doctrine, as opposed to the identification of the policy domains to which the ill-defined doctrine applies. 15 'Rolland's laws', the principles of continuity, equality and adaptability outlined by Professor Rolland in the 1930s, have been supplemented by new rules established by Parliament. These newer rules include provision relating to quality of service and transparency, parallel to the principles of EC law, and are not universally applied to all public services.
The related common law doctrine of common callings 16 has been virtually obliterated by over a century of sector specific legislation in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 17 though it is still remembered in the United States under the duties of common carriage, and the juridical definition of public utility services which has a key role in delineating the capacity of the state for intervention in the utility sectors. 18 19 It is useful because it provides the basis for demarcating according to function services which might receive special treatment (either in the form of special rights or special obligations) but in a somewhat plural manner, capable of comprehending more than one distinctive form of public interest.
The EC law term, 'services of general interest' accords loosely with the welfare economics conception of public and quasi-public goods, 20 extending from services which are typically provided in some kind of market with payment at point of use, such as the utility services (more specifically identified in Arts 16 and 86(2) as ' services of general economic interest' (my italics)) to include services which might be provided through markets, but often are provided by the state directly where the market would not provide in sufficient quantity, and/or at sufficient quality, at a price affordable to all (for example health care and education) to services which are regarded as solely within the state's responsibility either because they are unmarketable (for example social security payments) and/or because they are matters which the state would never want to trust to anyone else (for example issue of passports, registration of birth, deaths and marriages, administration of taxation systems and punishment of citizens). 21 We can thus think of three types of service of general interest: the economic (as recognised by the EC Treaty); the social; and the strategic. 22 When all three classes of service are considered together it is clear that there is no single set of public interest issues at stake. In some cases the presence of monopoly or the essential considerable scope for developing the old common law principles to provide appropriate principles of public service: 'Public Utilities and Public Law', in P. Joseph 
Conflicting Values in Regulating Services
Orthodox accounts of the essential regulatory requirements for public services typically place most emphasis on universal service requirements, that is, requirements that service providers should make services available to all who demand them, at affordable costs and with reasonable quality. These ideas are linked to the meta-ideas of social interdependence or social cohesion. 25 The universal service obligation, developed in the context of utility services, cannot fully apply to services such as health and education because 22 Malaret Garcia (op cit n 14 pp66-67) notes only the economic and social types, to which I have added the third strategic type of service. suffused with the economic values relating to efficiency and probity. 31 In the field of consumer safety we find a strong orientation towards the continuity/security values, represented, for example, by the complex web of overlapping self-regulatory and legislative rules operating both horizontally (across sectors) and vertically at both national and EC-level (i.e. a marked tendency towards redundancy, which is in tension with core economic values). 32 It is immediately apparent that there is considerable scope for conflict between the values which are applied to public services. Even within a narrow universal service definition a balance has to be struck between quality and affordability. Thinking about the wider values, concerns with efficiency are likely to be in a constant tension with social-procedural and continuity-security values. Accordingly regulatory regimes should be seen not simply as consisting of techniques to apply the various desirable values to public services, but rather as providing mechanisms by which to mediate the inherent tensions between such values. This is one of the principal reasons why governments and ministers have found it difficult to create wholly independent service provision or regulatory mechanisms for public services. A particular problem for public service law, as opposed to administration, is the difficulty of adapting legal norms historically concerned with controlling state activity (the so-called red light theory of administrative law 33 ) to the creation of 31 Though we should note considerable evidence of redundancy even in the core oversight mechanisms for oversight of expenditure of EC funds: C. Hood, C. Scott, O. James, G.Jones and T.Travers Regulation Inside Government Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999 pp170-174. The term redundancy is used in this context to refer to a system within which there there is a superfluidity of control mechanisms, such that no one control mechanism is necessary, as its function would be taken up by another were it not there. 
Regulatory Regimes: Pure and Hybrid Forms
Regulation is conceived of in orthodox accounts as a form of control in which powers are given to an agency to oversee the conduct of a sector or industry. Whilst this is one institutional form of regulation, common in the United States, it does not exhaust the set of regulatory regime-types which might be applied to public services. Regulatory capacities are often not located in a single agency. It is more helpful to think about regulatory regimes which consist of three essential functions: standard setting, monitoring and behavioural modification. Any effective regulatory regime must have all three elements: a mechanism by which standards are set; processes by which compliance with the standards is monitored; processes by which regulatees who diverge from the standards are brought back into line. 37 Working with this functional definition of a regulatory regime, we can see that a wide range of regime-types for control of the public sector are available.
I group these into hierarchical, market, and community-based forms and hybrids. We should note that each of these relatively simple classifications has within it a wide range of possible forms. The pure forms for each mechanism are so classified where the standard setting, monitoring and National regulators will monitor service providers, whether publicly or privately owned, for compliance with these standards and apply or seek sanctions for those which are in breach. This model is also widely used in respect of safety requirements, for example in the work place. 41 Less formal hierarchical models are also common within the public services. Centralised control over education and health care commonly gives to ministers powers to set standards and to monitor for their compliance and apply formal or informal sanctions to bring defaulters back into line.
Such hierarchical models have come under considerable pressure over recent years. Regulation over private sector activity has been criticised from a variety of theoretical perspectives as excessive, inefficient or corrupt.
Hierarchical structures within public sector bureaucracies have been identified with inefficiency and a lack of dynamism and responsiveness to users in public services. 42 A rejection of traditional models has been accompanied by a search for alternatives by which to execute each of the three regulatory functions. A significant regulatory reform movement sees its task as one of maintaining or improving effective regulation, while reducing the costs. 43 One option is to retain hierarchical structures but reduce the dependence on Competition in the market can also be thought of as a regulatory regime, in the sense that it has mechanisms for setting standards, for example in relation to price and quality, mechanisms for monitoring compliance and for applying sanctions to those who deviate from those standards. 45 In contrast with the hierarchical models, each of these capacities is dispersed among the buyers and sellers in the market, through endowment with private law rights, with reflexive or responsive development of standards and monitoring mechanisms. 46 To describe the private rights mechanism as a regulatory system in this way makes certain assumptions about the buyers: that they have good information about price and quality, that they will punish those suppliers who deviate by buying elsewhere and have effective remedies for default. In practice most markets are less than perfect. Notwithstanding such imperfections in markets there has been a considerable movement towards exploiting the regulatory capacities associated with the activities of dispersed groups of purchasers, using variously contractual documents, contract specification and contract remedies. privatization of public enterprises and shifting them towards market forms of governance in respect of the availability of capital and senior staff (each linked to the market for corporate control 47 ). A different form is to create internal markets within public sector provision as with the UK National Health Service, with health authorities (purchasers) separated from hospitals (providers), and allocation of resources shaped by purchasing decisions made using quasicontracts. A third form is the contracting out of services and the deployment of tendering, contract specification and contract compliance to secure enhancement to public services. Indeed the use of the state's contracting power, a deployment of the capacities derived from its wealth, has a long pedigree as a form of competition-based regulation for both social and economic purposes. 48 Private liability rules already apply to many public sector activities and operate as a market-type incentive, for example to provide services safely, 49 or at appropriate quality. 50 provided on a market basis, with contractual rights for customers (though they may also be subject to some form of hierarchical or community-based regime for quality and safety). Market forms of regulation have typically sought to enhance the capacities of purchasers to exercise regulatory functions and/or to inject competition in the provision of services. The drawing up of performance league tables for schools in England and Wales provides an example of a mechanism which is intended to have both effects. On the supply side schools are supposed to enhance their performance so as to achieve a good place in the league table, and to avoid being 'named and shamed' as failing, while on the demand side parents are to use the information in league tables to select which school to send their child too, creating the possibility that ultimately there will be no demand for underachieving schools. This is the market process of natural selection. The development of any one of the three 'pure' models noted above for the regulation of European public services is not very plausible given the long traditions of public ownership and control. What is more likely is that hybrid models combining two more of the pure models will be developed. The relationship between the pure and hybrid forms is shown in Figure 1 . Within the competition-community hybrid a typical pattern will be the formation of more than one community-based group to operate some form of self-regulation, such that the self-regulatory groups will compete both for membership of the group and for recognition by customers in the market. 58 The effect is to discipline the self-regulators to balance the interests of their The charter technique is exemplified by the UK Citizen's Charter programme (now renamed 'Service First') under which public service providers and government departments are required to publish their standards 59 Ayres and Braithwaite op cit, chapter 2. 60 Malaret Garcia op cit n14 p80.
of service and offer redress when things go wrong. 61 This programme was widely thought to reduce political accountability for public services and to overstate the rights of citizen as consumer and downplay rights to participate in shaping public services collectively. 62 Under the Blair Government elected in 1997 there is some evidence that these deficiencies in the programme, renamed Service First, will be addressed. 63 An example of the technique in action is in the UK telecoms sector, where the regulator, OFTEL, has required telecommunications operators (TOs) (both fixed link and mobile) to draw up customer codes dealing with such matters as time to install lines and fix faults.
In truth this is a hybrid of all three models (G), since it creates a form of contractual penalty for breach of the requirements of the codes.
Matching Values to Techniques
We The basic principle for deciding on the appropriate match in any particular case is that policy makers should pay close attention to the distribution of the key resources capable of securing the achievement of the desired values. 66 In some cases the possession of information by firms to be regulated makes them very powerful. Techniques which combine community and hierarchy (notably the 'enforced self-regulation' model) can exploit that capacity, and harness it to the pursuit of public interests. 67 Where consumer groups are powerful, because they are well resourced or otherwise have effective organisation or good information, these capacities can be used (for example in spreading information about different service providers thus facilitating competition-based mechanisms, or in monitoring and pursuing enforcement, strengthening the hierarchical dimension of a regime 68 ).
This organic principle must be combined with a sensitivity to considerations of the culture within any particular state. Strong traditions of self-regulation or agency regulation are likely to make new regimes using these forms more familiar, more legitimate and ultimately more successful.
Overall any effective intervention in a policy domain to seek modifications to behaviour is likely to consist of modest shifts to existing positions and configurations. Public authorities may receive some modest increase to their powers; the extent to which firms control information may be reduced, for example through disclosure requirements; the capacity of consumer groups to monitor activities can be enhanced through provision of existing resources.
Solutions to the problem of how to secure the achievement of any particular values in any particular domain are likely to differ from state to state and domain to domain. Where the EC legislation is developed the challenge is to provide statements of values which are sufficiently robust to be meaningful, but sufficiently flexible to allow member states to develop effective regulatory mechanisms to secure compliance. attention to the incentives created by any particular model adopted. The question of fit can be seen as an issue of 'structural coupling' -how best to align the discourse of the regulatory regime with that of the regulated domain. 69 It would be surprising if Member States found it appropriate to converge upon any one model for any particular sector given the history of diversity. Judicial supervision of new arrangements is likely to be problematic.
The English courts have struggled to understand the nature both of regulation and of contracts set within hybrid arrangements. 70 The use of such hybrids implies a form of regulatory instrumentality which is alien to the relatively pure categories of public and private law recognised by the courts. Adapting the concepts of the public and the private and the relationship between them is at the heart of the juridical challenge set by the ambition to develop and apply appropriate principles to services of general interest in EC law.
